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Ourestimates of effective rates of protection and resource costs are summa-
rized in Tables 10—1 and 10—2. The sample of industries is not small (see
Table 8—1) but biased—large, modern public industries are overrepresented,
while private enterprises are grossly underrepresented (in fact, included solely
in the cotton textile industry). Discriminated against by the government in
regard to commodity input and credit and foreign exchange allocations, these
private enterprises have had, at the same time, more freedom (or, at least,
more possibilities of evasion) in pricing. By virtue of their labor-intensive
technology, they are often competitive at international prices and have suc-
ceeded in exporting part of their production. Apart omission of such
firms, the estimates in the tables are also very uncertain for some of the in-
dustries that are covered. Great caution should therefore be exercised in
generalizing on the basis of our findings.
We note first that, with the exception of cement, all industries have at
some time enjoyed protection to varying degrees. For some industries the effec-
tive rates af protection have been very high: iron and steel and automobile
assembly are the extreme examples, but paper and yarn (the latter in 1970)
had high effective rates of protection, too. In an institutional setup like that
of Egypt, particularly after 1961, high rates of protection in themselves do
not necessarily indicate either inefficiency and lack of competitiveness or re-
source pull and misallocation of resources. Protection may have accompanied
the establishment of a domestic monopoly; in that case, a high measured rate
of protection would indicate not high costs but high monopoly profits, and
production could quite well be efficient and competitive in foreign markets
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TABLE 10-1
Effective Rates of Protection (ERPs) in Ten







Cement —31—45—35 — —28 —
Phosphates 15 34 — — 7
Nitrates 25 48 — — 12 —
Sugar — — —5 — — 14
Tires — —240 262 — —
Cotton
Fabric — —— — 68 —
Yarn — 31 '62 — — 213 •
Automobiles — —— •305 — —
Paper —— — 240 — —
Iron and steel — — — — 599 —
SOURCE: Hansen and Nashashibi, NBER Working Paper No. 48, 1975.
(the scale of production may even be too small). The tire industry offers an
example of this kind of protection. In any case, since the beginning of the
sixties, and to some extent even earlier, resource allocation has been deter-
mined by government decisions based on criteria other than private profit-
ability. Hence, resource costs offer a better basis for discussing competitive-
ness and resource allocaion.
The DRCs indicate a rather mixed situation at the end of the fifties. Two
of the traditional industries—sugar and cement—were competitive or close
to being so, while the important cotton textile industry was definitely noncom-
petitive at the then existing official exchange rate and given the ban on foreign
cotton. But our estimates also indicate that, ifforeignshort staple cotton had
been available as the raw material base, the production of yarn (and probably
also of cloth) would have been almost competitive at the beginning of the
sixties. If we add to these industries phosphate fertilizer, which was founded
as a private venture prior to the Second World War, it could be said that
all major industries established under the "ancien régime" had developed and
maintained a comparative advantage and (with the above-mentioned qualifica-
tion in regard, to the cotton textile industry) were competitiveatinternational
prices. As could be expected, these industries are intensive in abundantly
available domestic resources such as labor (sugar, textiles) or raw materials
(cement, phosphate). In the case of textiles itwasthe compulsory use ofRESOURCE USE EN SELECTED MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES 311
TABLE 10-2
Domestic Resource Costs (DRCs) in Ten
Manufacturing Industries, Selected Years






Cement (f.o.b.) 20 21 28 — 31 —
Phosphates
(c.i.f.) 38 36 — — 33 —
(f.o.b) — —— — 36 50
Nitrates
(c.i.f.) 52 61 — — 52 —
(f.o.b. — —— — 62 —
Sugar, refined — — 34 — — 54
Tires
(c.i.f.) —— 59 59 — —
(f.o.b.) —— — 62 — —
Cotton textiles .
Fabric (f.o.b.) ——— — 70 —
Yarn (f.o.b.) 47a56 — — 86
Yarnb based on
foreign cotton
(f.o.b.) — 38 — — 54
Automobiles (c.i.f.)—— — 113 — —
Paper (c.i.f.) ——— 208 — —
Iron and steel (c.i.f.)— — — — 480 —
Exchange razes
Official rate 35.235.235.2 43.5 43.5 43.5
"Realistic" rate
(suggested by
IMF, 1966) ——— — 61 —
Souxca: Hansen and Nashashibi, NBER Working Paper No. 48, 1975.
a. 1956.
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domestic raw materials that made the industry noncompetitive; the real
strength of the industry stems from its labor intensity.
After World War II, an attempt was made to go beyond the agriculture-
based industries and manufacture basic intermediate products and consumer
durables as import substitutes: paper, tires, nitrates, iron and steel, and auto-
mobiles. Some of these are highly capital-intensive (nitrate and paper) and
most have a rather high import content. These industries were all founded
under a highly protective regime, first via tariffs, later via quantitative restric-
tions. An evaluation of the DRCs of these industries during the 1960s shows
that none achieved competitiveness at the then existing exchange rates, a!-
though both nitrates and rubber tires appear to be successful infant industries
that would become competitive with the currency devalued to the "realistic"
level advocated by the IMF.
It is also remarkable that a number of industries fared as well as they
actually did after the devaluation of 1962, despite the nationalizations, em-
ployment drive, wage increase, and permanent foreign exchange crises. Phos-
phates, nitrates, and tires showed falling or unchanged DRCs, and cement
continued to be competitive at the old exchange rate—albeit with a small
increase in its DRC. In the first two industries important technological in-
novations were introduced at this time, and the latter two were able to im-
prove their efficiency within the given technology. The strong increase in the
DRC for phosphate in 1970 was due to a fall in the international price for
this commodity.
But other industries—probably the majority—fared less well. The two
big old industries which should have passed the infant industry stage a long
time ago—sugar proèessing and cotton textiles—suffered a serious setback
in competitiveness. These two are probably typical of manufacturing, apart
from the "good" industries mentioned above. And then there were the en-
tirely unsuccessful new industries—the Heiwan iron and steel plant, the auto-
mobile assembly plant, and perhaps paper and pulp.
All industries of both relatively and absolutely deteriorating competitive-
ness suffered, of course, from the cost inflation and other problems of the
period, particularly from falling or at best stagnant international prices. Inter-
national competition in basic intermediate commodities is quite keen and
technological innovations are rapid. The central administration has distorted
the pattern of imports and domestic production. Apart from the paper work in-
volved in the administration of these multiple price structures, production has
been shifted from the underpriced commodities (for example, construction steel
or popular types of textiles) toward more profitable products. This, in turn, has
brought shortages to black markets and has distorted the pattern of imports.'
Certainly, if prices for certain commodities or labor are to be used for attaining
social targets, an alternative set of accounting prices should govern decisions ofRESOURCE USE IN SELECTED MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES 313
industrial firms as to production and use of resources. While resource flows
have been diverted by the price structure, there are also instances where firms
have suffered a distortion in their capital costs: some firms have reported pay-
ing higher prices than prevailing elsewhere for capital equipment imported from
Eastern Europe, others have complained of being forced to finance the con-
struction of social overhead (such as roads, electricity, water) in their location.
But all this, along with the domestic inflation, affected the "good" industries
as well.
The difference between the "good" and "bad" industries seems to be a
matter of good or bad investment planning. For every one of the industries with
declining competitiveness, it can be shown that inadequate investment planning
by the authorities (i.e., the Ministry of Industry) was, if not the sole cause
of the decline of competitiveness, certainly an important contributing factor.
The cotton textile industry was largely ignored by the Egyptian planners
during a period when the developed countries and some underdeveloped ones
modernized and rationalized this branch of manufacturing. Indeed, no overall
modernization has taken place in the industry since the equipment replace-
ment that occurred immediately after World War II. Moreover, the cre-
ation of additional capacity lagged behind demand, resulting in shortages
and loss of exports. The sugar industry was expanded substantially during
the sixties, and the immediate cause of the sharp decline in its competitive-
ness was the particularly strong increase of rural wages during the first half
of the sixties. If the relative increase of rural wages turns out to be a temporary
phenomenon that will be reversed once the armed forces are reduced again,
the decline of competitiveness is also a temporary phenomenon. In that case,
from a longer-term point of view, the sugar industry could be included among
the "good" industries. But the prospect is different if the change in relative
wages proves to be a permanent feature of the economy, which is quite pos-
sible since the gap between rural and urban wages usually diminishes during
the process of development. From that standpoint, either the industry should
not have been expanded at all, or a less labor-intensive technology should
have been chosen (if it exists). The competitiveness of both the sugar and
paper industries, incidentally, could have been somewhat improved had pulp
production on the basis of bagasse been expanded. This technical process is
relatively new, however, and it is not obvious that Egyptian planners lagged
much behind on this score. The paper and pulp industry was clearly planned
on a suboptimal scale, while the Heiwan steel plant is ill-conceived in several
other respects besides its obsolete technology. It is not clear, however, that
steel production could not be a competitive activity if it were based on Western
Desert ores, worked on the basis of up-to-date technology, and with more
adequate planning in other respects. The new Soviet-built steel complex in
Heiwan will eventually have to deliver the proof.314 PROTECTION, CONTROLS, AND COMPETITIVENESS IN INDUSTRY
The investments in the old Heiwan steel plant and the automobile assem-
bly plant were largely a waste of money (at least if any external learning
effects are left out). They amounted to about one quarter of the investments
made in the industries considered in this chapter. Thus, the losses from in-
adequate investment planning are very considerable. Apart from the auto-
mobile undertaking, there is no evidence to suggest that public investments
were made in the wrong sectors. A better direction of the given volume of
investments, with a more appropriate choice of technology in some sectors,
could have probably saved the situation for those industries that actually suf-
fered a loss of competitiveness. The wage increases would then have been
an adjustment to increased labor productivity and not at all a cost inflation.
In this indirect way, it may be argued that bad investment planning was the
root cause of manufacturing industry's problems during the sixties.
There is an aspect of investment planning, generally neglected by the
authorities, which has undoubtedly resulted in substantial losses in produc-
tivity: capital replacement. It is not so much a question of inadequate capital
appropriations for replacement of equipment as reflected in the accounts
of individual enterprises; indeed, these seem to conform with standard de-
preciation methods. Rather, it is the foreign exchange allocations and actual
deliveries of equipment for this purpose that have fallen far short of demand
from individual enterprises. The net profits realized in the fiscal year 1970—71
in industry by the public sector amounted to only 2.4 percent of the estimated
value of invested capital.2 Even if this is interpreted as retained earnings (after
taxes, dividend payments, and debt servicing), it is much too low for self-
financing and would place a heavy burden on the Treasury for financing
capacity expansion. To be sure, industrial firms have no discretionary power
over the disposal of their profits, which revert, in any case, to the state coffers.3
Moreover, the Treasury favors the more profitable firms when considering
requests for capacity expansion or replacement, which—given the distortion
introduced in the distribution of profits by the price structure—biases invest-
ments away from enterprises that are socially "loaded." With a general foreign
exchange shortage and pressure to start new projects as well as completing
ongoing projects with costs exceeding original estimates, capital replacements
tend to be ignored. We have already mentioned the example of cotton textiles,
where modernization and expansion as well as ordinary replacement were
postponed during, the sixties. As a consequence, overutilization of partly
obsolete machinery and equipment became a serious problem already in 1965,
aggravated after the 1967 War. The share of gross investment in GDP was
steadily shrinking, reaching 11 percent in 1970-7 1, and much of it went into
new capacity, particularly the construction of the steel complex and the ex-
pansion and relocation of the fertilizer industry. Sugar offers another striking
illustration of entirely inadequate replacement during the years from 1967 toRESOURCE USE N SELECTED MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES 315
1973. A survey of cotton ginning mills, railroads, and printing plants revealed
that much of the equipment in these industries was in an acute state of obsoles-
cence, indeed, in many cases in a state of outright decay, causing severe declines
in productivity. The stepmotherly treatment of replacement needs is beyond a
reasonable doubt closely related to the monopolization of foreign exchange
resources and the concentration of decision making concerning industrial in-
vestment in the hands of the Ministry of Industry. There is sufficient evidence
to conclude that a general worsening has taken place since 1965 in the financial
position of industrial firms in the public sector, together with (what is even
more serious) a deterioration in the overall state of the country's capital stock
as a result of insufficient capital replacement.
Inadequate investment planning also affected the good industries in other
ways. Insufficient attention was given to linkages and to demand, particularly
export demand. Lags in capacity expansion were noteworthy in the case of
cement, but occurred also in the case of phosphate fertilizers, where failure to
develop the necessary transportation facilities hampered the growth of out-
put in the early 1960s and caused imports to rise. The automobile industry
was left without reliable domestic sources of inputs (with the exception of
tires), and both cement and fertilizers had to use imported packing material
for a long time when it could have been supplied domestically.
But in regard to linkages the Egyptian authorities seem to have learned
from their past mistakes. After the first five-year plan and the foreign exchange
crisis, an increasing awareness seems to have grown out of the need to "ratio-
nalize" investments by supporting them with the necessary infrastructure,
optimizing their location, and exploiting their potential linkages; the integra-
tion of the new steel complex with the chemicals and engineering industries
and the utilization of bagasse for kraft paper bags can be cited as examples.
MoreQver, greater concern seems to be shown for exports, and a number of
recent investments, particularly in the fields of cement and fertilizers, are
export-oriented. In addition, a more favorable treatment is being afforded
small private enterprises which have succeeded in exporting part of their pro-
duction; they have been receiving increasing foreign exchange quotas and
their export procedures have been simplified.
On other hand, in the particular industries under review we have
found little to indicate that the foreign exchange situation and the exchange
regimes per se either damaged competitiveness or seriously disrupted current
production. It is true that there have been instances of production disruptions
directly related to raw materials and other shortages, but they have been
mainly temporary, although the distortive effects of quantitative trade restric-
tions may have had a permanent and cumulative impact on other sectors
through their normal linkages. Thus, we have shown how the 1916 ban on
foreign cotton increased the costs of the textile industry and limited textile316 PROTECTION, CONTROLS, AND COMPETITIVENESS IN INDUSTRY
mills to using machinery adapted for long staple cotton, delaying the introduc-
tion of artificial fibers as well as short staple cotton. Another series of re-
strictions was necessary to ensure the textile mills of a sufficient supply of
domestic cotton, which distorted the pattern of raw cotton production and
exports. The ban on imports of phosphates in 1953, while increasing the
capacity utilization of the industry, resulted in domestic excess demand that
was satisfied neither by expansion of domestic capacity nor by imports. It
was only after the effects of this measure were badly felt in agriculture that
phosphate imports were resumed. In the post-1961 regime, with direct alloca-
tion of foreign exchange to various ministries, a more erratic pattern of trade
developed, with wide fluctuations in the imports of certain commodities such
as tires and paper. But these, as well as some abnormal inventory accumula-
tions during the years 1964 to 1966, may be attributed as much to inadequate
demand forecasting at the firm level as to inefficiency inherent in centralized
trade administration. In any event, central planning did not improve the ad-
justment of supply to demand.
Finally, it is important to recall that the industries included in our study
are mainly large public enterprises favored at the expense of small private
enterprises. That the latter have suffered badly from shortages of raw materials,
spare parts, capital goods, and credit is clear. Small private enterprises in
industry and handicrafts, together with private consumers, were the main
victims of the exchange regimes, but we have no data that can serve to
measure, or even indicate, the loss of production in such enterprises or the
loss of consumer satisfaction.
NOTES
I. "Report of the Committee on the Revelation of Truths on the Subject of the
Rise in the Price of Steel and the Trade of Scrap Metal," and "The Public Sector
Where to?" Al Talia, August 1973, pp. 11—24 and pp. 66—72, respectively.
2. In the publicly owned industrial enterprises net profits were £E40.8 million on
art estimated capital stock and circulating capital of £El,700 million. It is not known
how this figure has been estimated. Ibid., p. 67.
3. This is perhaps the most urgent area of reform, since it seems to affect even the
smallest capital expenditures on technical progress. For example, the sugar industry 1
requested from the Treasury LEI million in foreign exchange to purchase equipment
which would allow it to reduce the proportion of sugar left in the discarded bagasse. By
its estimates such a measure would result in a net addition of 10,000 tons of sugar
annually. The request was rejected by the Treasury, which stated that the priorities in
foreign exchange allocation were determined by the Ministry of Industry. Ibid., pp. 56—57.